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THE DELIMITATION OF THE MARITIME ZONES AROUND
THE FRENCH COLLECTI VITI TERRITORIALE OF SAINTPIERRE-AND-MIQUELON
Merritt R. Blakeslee*

INTRODUCTION

On July 29, 1991, an international court of arbitration convened
in New York City to hear arguments by France and Canada in their
thirty year-old dispute over rights to the waters surrounding the French
possession of Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon. The court, which is chaired
by the Honorable Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga of Uruguay, a former
justice of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, will render
a binding and unappealable decision in the arbitration in early 1992.
A.

Overview of the Franco-CanadianDispute

Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon are a group of small islands lying 15
miles off the south coast of Newfoundland outside of the Gulf of
St. Lawrence and the Cabot Strait on the edge of the Laurentian
Channel in the Atlantic Ocean.' The islands have a surface area of
93 square miles, a coast line of 10.5 miles, and, according to recent
figures, a population of approximately 6500. The main industries of
the islands are fishing and tourism. Prior to 1976, the islands were
a French territoire d'outremer. In 1976, they became a dbpartement,
and in June, 1985, they were made a collectivit territoriale.
Since the 1960s, France and Canada have been locked in a dispute
over the fishing and hydrocarbon rights in the zone surrounding the
islands, and in 1966 a moratorium on oil and gas exploration was
put in place. In the early 1970s, the fishing dispute was complicated
when Canada closed the Gulf of St. Lawrence to foreign fishing
* The author, who holds a Ph.D. in French literature from Tulane University
and a J.D. magna cum laude from the University of Georgia School of Law,
practices international trade law with the firm of Steptoe & Johnson in Washington,
D.C. He wishes to express his gratitude to Professor Louis B. Sohn, Woodruff
Professor of International Law, University of Georgia School of Law, for the latter's
guidance in the preparation of this study.
I See Appendix, Figures la and lb.
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vessels. In 1972, France and Canada negotiated an agreement that
permitted France's fishing rights to be phased out over a period of
fifteen years.
France's declaration in 1976 of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone
around the islands and Canada's declaration in the same year of a
200-mile fishery zone along its coast brought the claims of the two
countries directly into conflict. When the phase-out period for French
fishing rights in the Gulf of St. Lawrence expired in 1986, the
controversy flared up again, exacerbated by political pressures in both
countries. In Canada, these political pressures were due in part to
the aftermath of a dispute between the central government and the
Maritime Provinces over rights to the continental shelf, 2 and in part
to the dissatisfaction of the inhabitants of Newfoundland, Canada's
poorest province and one heavily dependent on its fishing industry,
over the concessions on fishing quotas granted to France by Canada
in the latter's pursuit of a definitive settlement of the boundary
dispute.3 On the French side, these political pressures took the form
of vigorous and occasionally violent opposition by the Saint-Pierrais
on one hand and the Breton deep-sea fishing fleet on the other to
the fishing policy pursued by the metropolitan government.
The expiration at the end of 1987 of a fishing agreement between
Canada and the European Community, 4 and, thus, of any rights that
France might have had under that agreement, somewhat simplified
the parameters of the boundary dispute between France and Canada.
In 1987, Canada and France agreed in principle to submit the
delimitation question to arbitration,5 and in 1989 agreement on the
terms of the arbitration was finally reached.6 At the same time, the
2 For an exhaustive treatment of this dispute as it relates to the claims of
Newfoundland, see M. L. Jewett, The Evolution of the Legal Regime of the Continental Shelf (pts. I & 2), 22 CAN. Y. B. INT'L L. 153 (1984), 23 CAN. Y. B. INT'L
L. 201 (1985).
3 Representatives of Newfoundland were excluded from the final phase of the
negotiations that led to the 1987 arrangement granting France fishing rights off the
eastern coasts of Labrador and Newfoundland. Donat Pharand, The Cod War
Between Canada and France, 18 REv. GUN. 627, 628 (1987).
4 1981 Agreement on Fisheries between the European Economic Community and
the Government of Canada, 1981 O.J. (L 379) 59 reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 33 (1982).
1 The agreement is not published, but its terms have been discussed in Pharand,
supra note 3, at 628 n.1, who lists the unpublished documents memorializing the
agreement.
6 Agreement Establishing a Court of Arbitration for the Purpose of Carrying
Out the Delimitation of Maritime Area Between France and Canada, March 30,
1989, Can.-Fr., 29 I.L.M. 1 (1990) (done at Paris and Toronto) [hereinafter Maritime
Arbitration Agreement].
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parties reaffirmed the existing moratorium on oil and gas exploration
and reached an agreement on fishing quotas in the disputed waters7
through the end of 1991, the expected duration of the arbitration.
With respect to delimitation, the tribunal was asked to draw a single
line that would serve for all purposes, including rights to the floor
of the continental shelf, fishing rights, and exclusive economic zone
rights.
Initial memorials were to be submitted by June 1, 1990, and
8
countermemorials were to be returned by February 1, 1991. The
international court of arbitration convened on July 29, 1991, and
heard arguments through August 23, 1991. The court is composed
9
of five members. In addition to Justice Jimenez de Arechaga, there
is one judge from each of the parties, as well as a judge from the
United States and another from Italy. Silence has been imposed on
the parties with respect to any settlement proposals, 0 and a decision
by the tribunal is expected in early 1992.11
The present study analyzes the background to the Franco-Canadian
arbitration and the question submitted to the arbitral tribunal, details
the positions asserted by each party to the extent that these have
been made public or can be inferred, discusses the considerations
that may govern the eventual decision of the arbitral tribunal, and
suggests the form that a lasting settlement might usefully take.
B. Proportionalityand the Distant Island Problem
The Franco-Canadian dispute raises a problem known as "the
distant island problem.' 1 2 Where delimitation involves an island be' Agreement Relating to Fisheries for the Years 1989-91, March 30, 1989, Can.Fr., 29 I.L.M. 7 (1990) (done at Paris and Toronto) [hereinafter 1989 Fisheries
Ageement]. Article 5 of the agreement provides that the quotas may be extended
through the end of 1992 if an arbitral award is not forthcoming before then.
Maritime Arbitration Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 6(2).
Justice Jimenez de Arechaga also headed the international panel that ruled on
the dispute between France and New Zealand on the 1985 bomb attack on the
Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior. Court to Meet on Franco-Canadian Waters
Dispute, Agency France Presse July 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
World File.
10Maritime Arbitration Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 7(7).
11Ted L. McDorman, Canada and FranceAgree to Arbitrationfor the St. Pierre
and Miquelon Boundary Dispute, 5 INT'L J. ESTUARnE & COASTAL L. 357, 361
(1990) [hereinafter McDorman, Canada and France Agree to Arbitration].
12 For a review of the distant island problem, see generally Donald E. Karl,

Islands and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf.- A Framework for Analysis,
71 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1977); Robert D. Hodgson, Islands: Normal and Special
Circumstances, in LAW OF THE SEA: THE EMERGING REGIME OF THE OCEANS 137
(John King Gamble, Jr. & Giulio Pontecorvo eds., 1973).
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longing to one of two states that are adjacent or opposite, arbitral
panels have generally employed the equidistance principle as the
starting point for delimitation, making subsequent adjustments as
equity demanded. 3 The same principle has been employed where the
delimitation involved an island that was a sovereign entity and an
opposite or adjacent state. 4 Where the delimitation involves an island
that is a dependency whose sovereign state is neither adjacent nor
opposite to the other state, however, it has been argued that application of the equidistance principle is likely to produce an inequitable
result. The principle of proportionality, it is urged, militates in favor
of enclaving and against the use of the modified equidistance principle
even as the starting point for delimitation. As one commentator has
put it, "[p]roportionality, no less than equality, proceeds from the
general concept of equity, and equity may require either equal or
proportionate treatment depending on the particular circumstances
of the case."' 5 Under a broad construction of the proportionality
principle, consideration as a full baseline point should not be accorded
an entity, particularly a dependent entity, whose population, land
mass, or shoreline are grossly disproportionate to those of the other
party.' 6 In its narrowest and most mechanical application, the proportionality principle would take as the starting point for delimitation
7
the ratio between the dry land areas or the length of the coastlines
of the two parties.
Because of Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon's status as a dependency of
a distant sovereign; because of the disproportion between the islands'
land mass, shore line, and population and those of Canada; because
of their "awkward" proximity to the Canadian coast; and because
of the inability of the parties over a period of twenty-five years to
reach a negotiated settlement of the delimitation question, the controversy over Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon raises the distant island prob-

" See Arbitration Between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the
French Republic on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, June 30, 1977 & Mar.
14, 1977 (Cmnd. 7438, 1979), reprintedin 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979) [hereinafter Channel
Islands Arbitration].
Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 4 at 13 (June 3).
11Gunther Jaenicke, The Role of Proportionalityin the Delimitation of Maritime
Zones, in REALISM IN LAw-MAKING 51, 51 (Adriaan Bos & Hugo Siblesz eds. 1986).
16 Consideration as a full baseline point means that an entity is entitled to full
territorial rights in the maritime zone adjacent to it (i.e., the rights to a territorial
sea, an exclusive economic zone, and a continental shelf zone), undiminished by
considerations of proportionality.
Jaenicke, supra note 15, at 52.
4
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lem in its most acute form. It has been asserted that no previous
negotiation or arbitration of a delimitation involving the distant island
question offers an exact parallel with, and hence useful guidance for,
the present controversy. 8 For these reasons, the present arbitration
will be obliged to wrestle with a problem for which neither existing
legal principles nor past adjudications offers a ready solution.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

TO THE ARBITRATION

Dispute over Hydrocarbon Resources on the Continental Shelf

The Atlantic Coast of Canada contains significant hydrocarbon
reserves. According to one report, there have been fifty discoveries
of oil and gas in the continental shelf.' 9 While the hydrocarbon
potential of the area disputed in the present arbitration has not been
fully assessed, there have been discoveries of oil to the north of the
disputed area in the Hibernia field off the coast of Newfoundland
and discoveries of natural gas to the south in the Sable Island field
off the coast of Nova Scotia. 20
Beginning in the mid-1960s, both France and Canada issued exploration permits on the continental shelf to the south of the islands
within the exclusive economic zone claimed by France in 1976.21
Significantly, the French permits were issued to Petropar, the stateowned petroleum company. 22 A moratorium on exploration in this
area was apparently agreed to in 1966 and renewed in 1976, immediately after Canada announced its 200-mile fishery zone and
France its 200-mile exclusive economic zone, although the terms of
the moratorium have never been made public. 23 The moratorium
appears to have lapsed in 1981; and in 1983 a French seismic vessel,
escorted by a French naval vessel, began exploration in the area. The

Is Ted L. McDorman, The Canada-FranceMaritime Boundary Case: Drawing a
Line Around St. Pierreand Miquelon, 84 AM. J. INrr'L L. 157, 179 (1990) [hereinafter
McDorman, Drawing a Line].
19Id. at 160 n.1.
2 McDorman, Canada and France Agree to Arbitration, supra note 11, at 359.
21 Douglas Day, Maritime Boundaries, JurisdictionalDisputes, and Offshore Hydrocarbon Exploration in Eastern Canada, 23:3 J.CAN. STUDIEs 60, 69 (1988). For
a map showing the location of oil and gas leases in the disputed area, see Appendix,
Figure 2.
2 The French leases were subsequently transferred to Elf-Aquitaine, while the
Canadian leases were issued to Gulf Oil and later to Mobil and Texaco. Day, supra
note 21, at 69, 73.
2 McDorman, Drawing a Line, supra note 18, at 161 and n.24.
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French initiative triggered a Canadian protest and, in June 1984,
resulted in a new agreement, which similarly remains unpublished
but which reportedly provides that neither country will interfere with
the activities of the other in the disputed zone.2 The moratorium
was again threatened on June 9, 1987 when France announced a
decision to begin issuing oil exploration permits in the disputed zone,
apparently in retaliation for Canada's decision of March 17th to close
Canadian ports to French fishing vessels and for a lack of progress
in the negotiations to reopen them. Canada immediately protested,
and no permits appear to have been issued.
The area claimed by France is delimited on the landward side of
the islands by the line established in the 1972 Fisheries Agreement 25
and on the seaward side by a median line between the islands and
the coast of Nova Scotia that extends to a point beyond the 2000meter isobath on the continental shelf. 26 While this area represents
a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, under the 1982 United Nations
Law of the Sea Convention 27 France could, in theory, assert rights
to the continental shelf that would extend considerably farther, to
the seaward margin of the continental rise. 28 Since the technology to
search for oil and gas at depths below 2000 meters apparently will
be available in the not-too-distant future, it is possible that France
will argue that the delimitation to be handed down by the arbitral
tribunal should take account of both an exclusive economic zone and
a full continental shelf claim.
There is no indication that any hydrocarbon discoveries have been
made in the disputed area, although this is probably a function of
the successive moratoria on exploration and development rather than
a reliable index of the area's potential. Reportedly, the area north
of 45 °30'N is unpromising, while the area south of this line contains
thick Tertiary and Mesozoic sediments similar to those that have

24

Id. at 159.

Agreement on Mutual Fishing Relations, Mar. 27, 1972, Can.-Fr., 862 U.N.T.S.
209, 218 [hereinafter 1972 Fisheries Agreement]; see Appendix, Figure 3. This line,
which connects nine points, was established according to strict equidistance with
respect to five of the nine, the ninth of which is 12.85 nautical miles from Newfoundland and 14.5 nautical miles from Miquelon.
See Appendix, Figure 4.
27 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), U.N. Pub. No. E.83.V.5 (1983),
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention].
28 Id. at art. 77; see Appendix, Figure 5.
25
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yielded substantial hydrocarbon reserves in other areas. 29 The moratorium on exploration remains in effect,30 and a systematic exploration of the area awaits a resolution of the boundary dispute.
Commentators have speculated that energy-dependent France has
clung so tenaciously to its claims to an exclusive economic zone
around the islands because of this potential." This explanation is of
particular interest, since it suggests that the heat generated by the
dispute over fishing rights masks deeper concerns on the part of each
government over the as yet unrealized potential for significant hydrocarbon discoveries in the disputed area. If this is the case, it has
considerable significance in determining the positions of the parties
and the solution that might be acceptable to each.
B. The Dispute over Fishing Rights Along Canada's Atlantic
Coast
Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon constitute France's oldest overseas possession. When France relinquished its possessions in Canada to England in 1763, England ceded the islands to France "to serve as a
shelter to the French fishermen. ' 32 During the 19th Century, fishing
in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and along the Atlantic Coast of Canada
became a major activity of the French deep-sea fishing fleets. 33 A
series of treaties dating back to the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 and
culminating in the 1972 Fisheries Agreement protected this fishing.
1.

The 1972 Fisheries Agreement

The Fisheries 1972 Agreement grew out of Canada's decision in
1971 to declare the Gulf of St. Lawrence an exclusive fishing zone.
To that end, it negotiated a series of phase-out agreements with
countries whose fleets fished in the Gulf. With two exceptions,3 4 these
29 Day,

supra note 21, at 71. See Appendix, Figure 2.
10See 1989 Fisheries Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 4(b).
31Marie-Christine Aquarone, French Marine Policy in the 1970s and 1980s, 19
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 267, 276 (1988); McDorman, Drawing a Line, supra note
18, at 161; Commander James D. Gass, The French Claim to the Eastern North
American Continental Shelf, 27 JAG J. 367, 384 (1973).
32 Definitive

Treaty of Peace, Feb. 10, 1763, Fr.-Gr. Brit.-Spain,

1 BRIT. &

FoREIGN ST. PAPERS 422, 645; 42 PARRY's TS 279.
33C.R. Symmons, The Canadian200-Mile Fishery Limit and the Delimitation of

Maritime Zones Around St. Pierreet Miquelon, 12 OTTAWA L. REv. 145, 145 (1980).
14 The rights of the Faroese to fish by longline for porbeagle shark were extended
for successive periods of two years, subject to cancellation on one year's notice.
Pharand, supra note 3, at 631.
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other phase-out agreements terminated in 1976. Because France's
fishing rights were protected by treaty, vessels from metropolitan
France were permitted to continue to fish in the Gulf "on an equal
footing with Canadian vessels" for fifteen years, that is through May
35
15, 1986.
In return for France's renunciation of its fishing rights in the Gulf
at the end of that fifteen-year period, fishing vessels from metropolitan France would be permitted to fish in all Canadian waters
beyond the 12-mile territorial sea off Canada's Atlantic Coast in the
event that Canada extended the limits of its territorial sea or fishery
zone.3 6 In other words, following any declaration of a Canadian
fishery zone, vessels from metropolitan France would have fishing
rights both in the disputed area off Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon and
7
in other, entirely undisputed Canadian waters off the Atlantic Coast.1
Such fishing rights would, however, be subject to "measures for the
conservation of resources, including the establishment of quotas."38
Article 2 of the 1972 Fisheries Agreement was Canada's first assertion
of its right unilaterally to set quotas in its coastal waters, a right
that it has asserted with greater vigor since its declaration of a 20039
mile fishery zone in 1976.
With respect to Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon, coastal vessels and ten
trawlers registered in the islands were permitted to continue to fish
along the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia coasts and within the Gulf
in those areas where they had traditionally fished, 40 while Canadian
vessels were granted reciprocal rights to fish off the coast of the
islands.4 1 This was described as "an arrangement between neighbors"
that was undertaken "[in view of the special situation of Saint-

Pierre-and-Miquelon.

"42

A median line was drawn between the landward coast of the islands
and the Newfoundland coast.4 3 The line extends for fifty-four nautical

1972 Fisheries Agreement, supra note 23, at art. 3.
Id. at art. 2.
17 See Appendix, Figure 6 for the present limits of Canada's fishery zone.
111972 Fisheries Agreement, supra note 25, at art. 2.
39 Canada's right to set quotas unilaterally in the Gulf of St. Lawrence was
confirmed by the arbitral tribunal in the La BretagneArbitration. 90 REvuE GANtRALE
DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIc 713 at 752, 754-756 (1986) (paras. 58, 61, & 63). See infra
"

16

note 45.
40
41
42
43

1972 Fisheries Agreement, supra note 25, at art. 4.
Id. at art. 2.
Id. at art. 4.
See Appendix, Figure 3.
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miles and demarcates the territorial waters of Canada and "the zones
submitted to the fishery jurisdiction of France.""
Finally, the 1972 Agreement established a Commission to arbitrate
any future disputes 45 and contained a clause preserving "the future
claims of [both Parties] concerning . . . territorial waters or jurisdiction with respect to fisheries of the continental shelf."
This
agreement superseded all previous treaties on the subject, 47 and no
date was set for its expiration.
2.

The Relev4 des Conclusions of May 26, 1972

In 1972 France, and Canada signed a confidential document, designated a Relevt des Conclusions, concerning delimitation of the
maritime zone around the islands. The Relev 's binding effect, and
hence its relevance to the present controversy, will certainly be disputed by the parties. The Relevt has never been published, and
knowledge of its contents derives largely from the references thereto
made by the arbitral tribunal in the Channel Islands Arbitration.
Under the terms of the Relevt, France is said to have accepted a
12-mile zone of territorial sea around the islands, effectively enclaving
them, in exchange for joint management of the hydrocarbon reserves

1972 Fisheries Agreement, supra note 25, at art. 8.
Id. at art. 10. In 1987, a tribunal constituted under this article handed down
a decision, known as the "La Bretagne award," holding that the 1972 Fisheries
Agreement did not prohibit fishing trawlers registered in Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon
and operating in the Gulf under the Agreement from processing their catch on
board. The text of the decision is reproduced at 90 REv. GNARALE DE DROrr INT'L
PUBLIC 713 (1986). On the La Bretagne award, see Gilbert Apollis, La Sentence
arbitrale du 17 juillet 1986 dans le differend franco-canadien sur le filetage dans le
golfe du Saint-Laurent, 2 ESPACES ET RESSOURCES MARIrnEs 187 (1987); Jean Maurice
Arbour, L 'Affaire du chalutier-usine 'La Bretagne' ou les droits de l'btat c6tier dans
sa zone conomique exclusive, 24 CAN. Y. B. INT'L L. 61 (1986); William T. Burke,
Coastal State Fishery Regulation under International Law: A Comment on the La
Bretagne Award of July 17, 1986 (The Arbitration between Canada and France),
45

25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 495 (1988); Claude-Albert Colliard, Le Differend Franco-

Canadien sur le 'filetage' dans le golfe du Saint-Laurent (sentence arbitrale du 17
juillet 1986), 92 REv. GtNtRAE D DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 273 (1988); Hartimi Dipla,
L'Affaire concernant le filetage 6 l'int&rieur du golfe du Saint-Laurent entre le
Canada et la France (sentence arbitrale du 17juillet 1986), 1986 ANNUAIRE FRANVAIS
DU DROrI INT'L 239; Ted L. McDorman, French Fishing Rights in Canadian Waters:
The 1986 La Bretagne Arbitration, 4 INT'L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 52 (1989).
1972 Fisheries Agreement, supra note 25, at art. 9.
Id. at art. 1.
48 Channel Islands Arbitration, supra note 13.
46
41
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in the disputed area. 49 While the Channel Islands arbitral panel treated
the Relev as a "provisional" agreement, 0 it is reported that the
agreement never took effect because it was rejected by Canada. 5'
Commentators generally sympathetic to the Canadian position in the
dispute have treated the Relev as a fully consummated agreement
that should be accorded full precedential value. While these commentators assert that the Relev was cited by France as one of the
precedents for enclaving the Channel Islands, 5 2 it is not clear from
the arbitral decision whether the Relev was raised by France or Great
Britain.5 3 Because the Relev apparently gave France a fishing zone
of only twelve miles but rights to the continental shelf over a much
larger area, it is not illogical that Great Britain rather than France
should have argued the precedential value of the Relev to the Channel
Islands dispute. If this is, indeed, the case, then it will be more
difficult for Canada, who had refused to adopt the Relevt, to uphold
its authority as persuasive precedent in the present dispute.
3.

Declaration of 200-mile Zones by France and Canada

On July 16, 1976, France passed enabling legislation permitting the
declaration at a later date of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone
around the shores of metropolitan France and all overseas possessions.14 On November 1 of the same year, Canada declared a 200mile fishery zone, stressing, however, that the Canadian declaration
was intended "to be without prejudice to any negotiations or to any
positions which may have been or may be adopted respecting the
limits of maritime jurisdiction in such areas."" On February 25,
1977, France declared, "sous r6serve d'accords de d6limitation avec

McDorman, Drawing a Line, supra note 18, at 168 n.66.
10See Channel Islands Arbitration, supra note 13, at para. 177.
SI McDorman, Drawing a Line, supra note 18, at 168 n.66; see also D.M. McRae,
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the United Kingdom and France: The
Channel Arbitration, 15 CAN. Y. B. INT'L L. 173, 190 n.60 (1977).
52 McDorman, Drawing a Line, supra note 18, at 181; Symmons, supra note 33,
at 159. No commentator has argued in favor of the French position, and I failed
to locate any article on the subject written by an author from metropolitan France
save the periodic "Chroniques des faits internationaux" of Professor Rousseau in
the REVUE GtNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC.
11 See Channel Islands Arbitration, supra note 13, at para. 177.
49

14

Law no. 76-655 of July 16, 1976, 1976

FRANqAISE

[J.0.1 4299, 1976

JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RIPUBLIQUE
BULLETIN LtGISLATIF DALLOZ [B.L.D.] 317.

55Proposed Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order, 110 CAN. GAZETTE,
Extra no. 101 (Nov. 1, 1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1372 (1976). The Canadian
declaration entered into force on January 1, 1977.
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le Canada," a 200-mile exclusive economic zone around Saint-Pierreand-Miquelon, the first such zone declared by France for one of its

insular possessions .56
4. Disputes over Quotas: 1986-1987
A constant theme of the fisheries dispute between France and
Canada has been the allegations of French over-fishing, described by
pro-Canadian commentators as "massive'' 5 7 and a "plundering of
resources." 5 8 Over-fishing was a central issue in the La Bretagne
Arbitration, which recognized the ability of French factory freezer
trawlers to take catches far in excess of existing quotas.5 9 Following
the conclusion of the 1972 Fisheries Agreement, France and Canada
met periodically to negotiate quotas for the disputed zone and the
other areas in which France was permitted to fish under the terms
of the agreement. At the first meeting following the expiration of
the provision phasing out fishing in the Gulf of St. Lawrence by
metropolitan vessels, France indicated that it intended to take 26,000
6
metric tons of cod in Division 3Ps, which covers the disputed zone. 0
This represented a dramatic increase over the 6400 metric ton quota
previously allotted to France by Canada. 6' France challenged the
scientific data, furnished to Canada by the North Atlantic Fisheries
Organization, on which Canada relied in setting quotas. It also asserted its right to take 50% of the allowable catch in the disputed
area. This dispute led directly to the 1987 Conclusions Agr&4es.
5. The Conclusions Agres on Arbitration and Interim Fishing
Rights of January 24, 1987
Under the terms of an arrangement reached in early 1987, the two
parties were to undertake negotiations to conclude an agreement to
submit the delimitation question to international arbitration. 62 This
arrangement, aptly described by one commentator as "a negotiated

56 Decree no. 77-169 of Feb. 25,

1977, 1977 J.O. 1102.

Pharand, supra note 3, at 638.
11 McDorman, Drawing a Line, supra note 18, at 163.
11 90 REv. GtNtRALE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 713, 754-757 (1986) (paras. 61-63).
17

- See Appendix, Figure 6.
The Canadian figure of 6400 tons represents 15.607o of the total allowable catch

61

(TAC) for the disputed waters, a percentage based, according to the Canadians, on
historic fishing patterns. McDorman, Canada and FranceAgree to Arbitration, supra
note 11, at 357 and n.4.
62

See supra note 5.
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'non-agreement,"' 63 was not a formal agreement but an exchange of
notes referred to by the parties as the Conclusions Agrtkes. In addition, the parties were to negotiate quotas for the period 1988-1991
for French fishing vessels in Canadian waters outside of the disputed
area.
In order to obtain France's consent to pursue a final arbitration
of all claims, Canada made the significant concession of offering
France cod fishing rights in extensive areas off the coasts of Labrador
and Newfoundland during the period of the arbitration. 64 In a note
of December 30, 1986, Canada reaffirmed the quota for French vessels
of 6400 metric tons for Division 3Ps. On January 27, 1987, in a
second note Canada increased the number of divisions open to French
fishing and increased quotas in divisions already open, but decreased
the French quota in Division 3Ps to 2300 metric tons. 65 The arrangement also maintained in place the 1984 agreement not to interfere
with the activities of vessels belonging to the other party in the
disputed zone.6
The second Canadian note stressed that the quotas granted "exceed[ed] the legal obligations of Canada" and had been granted "only
so as to facilitate the process leading to the settlement of the dispute. "67 France protested strenuously against the level of the quotas
granted and against their unilateral imposition, asserting that these
quotas had always in the past been the subject of bilateral negotiations, and announced its own quota of 28,000 metric tons for 1988
and 26,000 metric tons for 1989 in the disputed area.
Shortly after the Conclusions Agr ,es were put in place, relations
between France and Canada deteriorated dramatically. On February
10, 1987, the premiers and representatives of Canada's ten provinces
called on the federal government to review the Conclusions Agr~kes
and to improve its consultation process with the provinces, accusing
the government of selling out Newfoundland fishermen in a "dirty
deal." On March 17, 1987, in response to France's announcement
of its intention to disregard the Canadian quotas, Canada closed all
of its ports to French fishing vessels and threatened to arrest any
French vessels caught fishing on the Burgeo Bank, an area inside
McDorman, Canada and France Agree to Arbitration, supra note 11, at 360.
These areas encompassed Divisions 2G, 2H, 2J, 3K, 3L, 3N, 30, 4R, 4S, and
4Vn; see Appendix, Figure 6.
65 Pharand, supra note 3, at 635-36.
6 See supra text accompanying note 24.
67 Quoted in Pharand, supra note 3, at 636.
63

"
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Division 3Ps but outside of the disputed zone. In protest, France
broke the talks in June. Negotiations were not revived until August

30th, following Jacques Chirac's arrival in Canada for an official
visit. In October, the talks broke down again, and Canada announced
the suspension of France's fishing rights in Canadian waters.
In April 1988, the Canadians arrested the Croix de Lorraine, a

fishing trawler registered in Saint-Pierre, for fishing in Canadian
waters. The French reciprocated in May, seizing a Canadian trawler
allegedly fishing in French waters. Nevertheless, the talks resumed in
April, and shortly thereafter the parties reached an agreement on a

formula for the arbitration.
On November 2, 1988, Inter-American Development Bank President
Henrique Iglesias was named as mediator, and on March 30, 1989,
agreements on arbitration and interim quotas69 were signed. The

flavor of the negotiations and the tensions that have accompanied
them are eloquently revealed by the procs-verbaux accompanying
the 1989 Fisheries Agreement and setting quotas in the disputed zone.70

68 See

Maritime Arbitration Agreement, supra note 6.
See 1972 Fisheries Agreement, supra note 7.
10 The Canadian Department of External Affairs wrote:
The annual cod quota set by the Canadian authorities for French vessels
in sub-division 3Ps, including the part of this zone which is claimed by
each party (the "disputed zone"), will be 15.6% of the TAC set by the
Canadian authorities annually. Fishing by French vessels in the undisputed
Canadian part of subdivision 3Ps will be allowed each year up to the date
on which a quantity equal to this quota has been taken by French vessels
in the subdivision as a whole. For this purpose, "disputed zone" shall have
the same meaning as it has had in practice up to now.
The Canadian authorities have taken note of France's intention of unilaterally setting an annual quota of 15,600t for 1989, 15,100t for 1990 and
14,600t for 1991, for French vessels in subdivision 3Ps. They reaffirm as
in the past that such a measure has no legal basis and that any fishing by
French vessels in excess of the quota set by the Canadian authorities
constitutes overfishing which can be tolerated only in consideration of the
present special circumstances.
With regard to the fish quotas specified in the proc~s-verbal of this date,
the Department emphasizes that these quotas exceed Canada's legal obligations under the Canada-France fisheries agreement of March 27, 1972,
and that they have been allocated solely to facilitate the process leading to
the settlement of the dispute between France and Canada concerning the
maritime claims of the two States off the coasts of Canada and SaintPierre-and-Miquelon.
It is not without difficulty that these quotas have been granted. The
French authorities have no doubt noted the radical measures Canada has
been obliged to impose on its own fishermen in several zones, particularly
in 2J3KL. It is therefore essential, for each stock affected by quotas for
69
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THE ELEMENTS OF A SOLUTION

A.

The Question to Be Answered by the Arbitral Tribunal
The arbitral tribunal was set the following task:
Ruling in accordance with the principles and rules of international
law applicable in the matter, the Court is requested to carry out
the delimitation as between the Parties of the maritime areas appertaining to France and of those appertaining to Canada ....

The

Court shall establish a single delimitation which shall govern all
rights and jurisdiction which the Parties may exercise under inter71
national law in these maritime areas.
72
The decision of the Court shall be final and binding.

the French vessels, that the amount set in the proc~s-verbal be the maximum
taken from that stock.
1989 Fisheries Agreement, supra note 6, at 12-13.
The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied:
The French authorities take cognizance of the mechanism described in
paragraph 2 of the note from the Department of External Affairs of Canada.
However, they note that the reference to 15.6%70 of the TAC set annually
by Canada in the 3Ps sector has no justification. They object most strenuously to the statement that any fishing activity beyond the level represented
by this percentage would constitute overfishing. As the Canadian authorities
know, France is legally at liberty to set fish quotas in the "disputed zone",
which constitutes its own exclusive economic zone over which it exercises
sovereign rights as determined by international law. The French authorities
point out, moreover, that the state of the stocks in this sector does not
justify the assertion that any quota higher than that determined by the
aforementioned percentage would represent over-exploitation of the biological resource, which France opposes as much as Canada does. They
confirm their intention to fix the total amount of the fish quotas allocated
to French vessels in 3Ps at the levels recommended by the mediator.
The French authorities believe that the agreement resulting from the
proc~s-verbal of this date constitutes an application of the France-Canada
agreement of March 27, 1972, which is the legal basis for Franco-Canadian
relations in the areas concerned. They categorically reject the statement
that the agreed allocations of resources were determined only in order to
facilitate the process of settling the dispute between Canada and France
regarding the maritime claims of the two States off the coasts of Canada
and France between Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon and Newfoundland. In this
respect, they recall that the only connection between the two problems is
that established by the "conclusions agr 6es" of January 24, 1987, by which
both parties agreed to establish simultaneously a procedure for third party
boundary delimitation and to set fish quotas during the period required
for this procedure.
Id. at 13-14.
7, Maritime Arbitration Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 2(1).
72

Id. at art. 10(1).
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The parties chose not to submit their dispute to the International
Court of Justice but to a specially convened arbitral tribunal." It
may be that this was done at France's insistence, since it has with74
drawn from the general jurisdiction of the Court.
The tribunal has been instructed to draw a single line of delimitation
for all uses, a solution that limits the discretion of the tribunal to
propose more imaginative solutions (e.g., different boundaries for
different purposes, joint management or development zones). It is
not impossible, of course, that the tribunal will disregard the strict
terms of its mandate and choose another solution.
B.

The Respective Positions of France and Canada

The Canadians are likely to assert that because they are an "anomaly" on the Canadian coast, the islands are entitled only to a twelvemile territorial sea, a position that the Canadians have stated publicly
in the past. The Canadian government has also stated publicly its
adherence to the principle of proportionality as the key to delimiting
the disputed maritime zones. 75 It has taken the position that the
French claim to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone on the
seaward side of the islands is "unrealistic" in view of the relative
land areas of the islands and the mainland. Under this view, enclaving
would represent a straightforward application of the equitable principles-relevant circumstances rule. The relevant circumstance would
be the gross disproportion between the land masses and shore lines
of the two parties. 76 In making this argument, Canada will likely rely
heavily on the decision in the Channel Islands Arbitration.77 Canada
is also likely to assert its need to retain control over its shipping
lanes into the Gulf of St. Lawrence and to assert its right to the
waters based on the fact that it has historically provided the region's
military, coast guard, and environmental services.

13Id. at art. 1.
Pharand, supra note 3, at 637.
11CAN. PARL. DEB., H.C. 32d Parl, 1st Sess, 17,265 (1982) (remarks of Hon.
J. Crosbie); CANq. PARL. DEB., H.C. 30th Parl, 1st Sess, 15,248 (July 12, 1976) (Sec.
of State for External Affairs); CAN. PARI. DEB., H.C. 30th Parl, 1st Sess, 14, 168
(June 4, 1976) (Sec. of State for External Affairs).
76 As Howard Strauss, lead attorney for the Government of Canada, has declared,
74

"The key factor is geography and respective length of the coasts . . .which in our

view makes equitable the 12-mile zone" that Canada would impose on the islands.
Canada and France in Court over Territorial Dispute, Reuters, July 30, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
77 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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The Canadian appointee to the arbitral tribunal is Alan Gottlieb,
former official in the Department of External Affairs and Ambassador
to the United States. One commentator has suggested that his appointment indicates that Canada expects to rely on proportionality,
an argument that is less legalistic than political, requiring the skills
78
of a seasoned negotiator and diplomat.
France will undoubtedly assert, in accordance with Article 121 of
the Law of the Sea Convention, 79 that inhabited islands are entitled
to be treated like any other land territory. Since the islands are able
to sustain human habitation and economic life, this much of the
French claim would seem incontrovertible. France will certainly take
the position that the islands are entitled to a 200-mile exclusive
economic zone, and perhaps, as noted above, to a zone extending
to the seaward margin of the continental rise, with delimitation to
be accomplished by application of the strict equidistance principle,
which accords the islands full weight as base points.80 The French
appointee to the tribunal is Professor Prosper Weil, author of a
recent work that argues that strict equidistance must be the starting
point for maritime boundary adjudication."' His appointment is revelatory of the position that the French are likely to adopt.
It is likely, however, that each party will argue not for a strict
application of its favored methodology-enclaving or equidistancebut for the use of that methodology as the starting point for a
provisional delimitation to which adjustments would subsequently be
made in order to ensure the equitableness of the ultimate solution. 2

71
79

McDorman, Canada and France Agree to Arbitration, supra note 11, at 360.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 27, at art. 121. The text of the article

reads in pertinent part:
Art. 121: Rkgime of Islands
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island
are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their
own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
80 As Jean-Pierre Puessochet, head of the French legal team, put it, "In principle,
islands, wherever they are located, have the right to a contental shelf and an exclusive
economic zone." Canada and Francein Court over TerritorialDispute Reuters, July
30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
"1 PROSPER WElL, THE LAW OF MARrnME DELIMITATION: REFLECTIONS 207 (1989).
82 McDorman, Drawing a Line, supra note 18, at 171.
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C. Finding the Relevant Rule of Decision
It is significant that the parties do not specify what law is to govern
the tribunal's decision. Both are parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,8 while as of May 31, 1989, neither
had ratified the Law of the Sea Convention, (which, in any event,
has not entered into force),8
Subsequent adjudications of maritime boundaries have set aside
the principle articulated in Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf, according to which equidistance is to be
employed unless there are special circumstances that would make an
equidistance line inequitable. In the North Sea ContinentalShelf Case,
the International Court of Justice rejected the assertion that equidistance modified by special circumstances had become the basic rule
of delimitation as a matter of customary law. The Court" held that
"delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with
equitable principles, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances." ' 85 In the Channel Island Arbitration, the Court found that
the equidistance-special circumstances rule satisfied the principles of
equity.16 The Court reaffirmed the equitable principles-relevant circumstances rule in 1985 in the Libya-Malta Adjudication.8 7 Similarly,
the Law of the Sea Convention stresses the role of equity in the
delimitation of maritime boundaries. It has been noted that previous
tribunals in maritime boundary disputes have attached little weight
to state practice or the decisions of prior tribunals, preferring instead

11 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,
499 U.N.T.S. 311.
Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 28 I.L.M.
792 (1989).
11North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
3, 53 (Jan. 20) (emphasis supplied).
86 Channel Islands Arbitration, supra note 13, at 422.
Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 4 at 31, 38 (June 3) (paras.
29 and 45).
88 The Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 27, at art. 74(1), states:
14

17

Article 74: Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with
opposite or adjacent coasts
1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with
opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.
See also art. 83(1), mandating the same role for equity in delimitations of the
continental shelf.
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to craft solutions carefully tailored to the particular circumstances
of the case before them. 9
In the Libya-Malta Adjudication, the International Court of Justice
adopted the principle of equidistance in its initial delimitation of the
continental shelf between the parties. 90 It then adjusted this provisional
line to the disadvantage of Malta in view of the disproportion in the
size of the two parties, hinting that the adjustment would have been
even less favorable to Malta had it been a dependent entity. 9'
Equidistance has been the rule of decision in most agreements
involving distant dependent islands. 92 Exceptions to this rule include
the agreements involving the Netherlands Antilles and Venezuela 9
and the recommendations of a conciliation commission concerning
Jan Mayen and Iceland. 94 Enclaving and semi-enclaving have provided
the rule of decision in a small number of agreements. 9 The most

89

McDorman, Drawing a Line, supra note 18, at 158 and n.4.

90Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 46 (para. 61).
91 Id. at 42 (paras. 52-53).
92 Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Great Channel
between Great Nicobar Island and Sumatra, Aug. 8, 1974, India-Indon., reprinted
in OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, LIMITs OF THE SEAS,
No. 62 (1975) [hereinafter LIMITS IN THE SEAS]; Agreement on the Delimitation of

the Seabed Boundary Between the Two Countries in the Andaman Sea, June 22,
1978, Thail.-India, reprinted in LUMTS OF THE SEAS, No. 93 (1981); Agreement on
the Delimitation of the Martimime Boundary in the Andaman Sea, in the Coco
Channel and in the Bay of Bengal, Dec. 23, 1986, Burma-India, UNITED NATIONS,
LAW OF THE SEA BULL., No. 10, November 1987, at 105; Agreement Relating to
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Greenland and Canada, Dec. 17,
1973, Can.-Den., 1974 Can. TS, No. 9; Agreement Between Norway and Denmark
(Faeroes), June 15, 1979; Treaty on Friendship and Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary Between the United States and the Cook Islands, June 11, 1980, U.S.Cook Islands, T.I.A.S. No. 10,774, reprinted in LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 100 (1983);
Treaty on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Tokelau and the

United States, Dec. 2, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 10,775, reprinted in

LIMITS IN THE SEAS,

No. 100 (1983); Accord de ddlimitation des zones 6conomiques (Runion), Apr. 2,
1980, Fr.-Mauritius, July 19, 1980, 1980, J.O. 1830; Convention de d6limitation
(Martinique), Mar. 4, 1981, Fr. St. Lucia, May 21, 1981, 1981 J.O. 1608; Convention
de d6limitation maritime (New Caledonia), Jan. 4, 1982, Fr.-Austl., Feb. 15, 1983,
1983 J.O. 562; Convention relative h la d6limitation des zones 6conomiques (WallisFutuna Islands), Jan. 11, 1980, Fr.-Tonga, Apr. 19, 1980, 1980 J.O. 987.
91 Treaty of Delimitation, Mar. 31, 1978, Venez.-Neth., 1978 Tractatenblad van
het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, No. 61.
94 Conciliation Commission on the Continental Shelf Area Between Iceland and
Jan Mayen, Report and Recommendations to the Governments of Iceland and
Norway, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 797 (1981); Agreement on the Continental Shelf
Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, done Oct. 22, 1982, Ice.-Nor., reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 1222 (1982).
91 Treaty Concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries, Dec. 18, 1978, Papua
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prominent, however, is the decision in the Channel Islands Arbitration.9 It is a major irony of the present dispute that France must
take a position diametrically opposite to that which it asserted in the
earlier case. In the Anglo-French dispute, France raised the principle
of proportionality as an argument for enclaving.Y The Court in the
Anglo-French dispute stressed the differences between the Channel
Islands dispute and that involving Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon, 9 and
the solution that the Court adopted-a median line between opposite
states modified by the enclaving of islands "on the wrong side of
the median line"99-is entirely inapplicable to the present dispute.
The Court's statement that the open waters to the south and east of
Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon allowed more scope for redressing ineq° implies
uities than did the narrow waters of the English Channel'O
that enclaving is a solution most appropriate to narrow waters.','
D.

Towards an Equitable Solution

The equitable principles-relevant circumstances rule is today widely
accepted in maritime boundary delimitations. This rule gives preference neither to equidistance, nor to enclaving, nor to any solution
dictated by judicial precedent or past practice. It is rather a rule
designed for application on a case-by-case basis to the end of producing a solution carefully crafted to the problem at hand. It is a
rule that lends itself to compromise and to inventive solutions. For
this reason, it is unfortunate that the parties have taken the step of
precluding any solution other than a single all-purpose line. Joint
access to fishing and joint development of hydrocarbon reserves in
the disputed area would seem to be two obvious areas where an
innovative solution might be found. Moreover, any solution that does
not provide for cooperation in the management of fish stocks will
be sadly defective, although the mandate to draw a single line does
not a priori preclude the inclusion of a cooperative mechanism.

N.G.-Austl., reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 291 (1979); Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, Aug. 20, 1971, Italy-Tunis., reprinted in 5 NEW
DIl CTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 247 (R. Churchill et al. eds., 1977).
" Channel Islands Arbitration, supra note 13.
Id. at 437, 438 (paras. 161 and 166).

91See id. at 444 (para. 200).

" Id. at 437 (para. 159).
100Id. at 444 (para. 200).

1oDAVID
262 (1987).

JOSEPH ATTARD, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
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It seems likely that the tribunal will eschew the strict application
of either the equidistance or the proportionality principle, instead
using one or the other as the starting point for a delimitation that
will subsequently be modified in the interests of equity. Of the two
possibilities, it seems slightly more probable that the tribunal will
choose the modified equidistance principle. First, this is the principle
that has been applied in the majority of delimitations and adjudications involving islands. Second, in granting France extensive interim
fishing rights in undisputed Canadian waters, Canada has strengthened France's position, since a tribunal removing these rights will
have a strong incentive to replace them with substantial fishing rights
in the disputed zone. Finally, the islands presently enjoy the status
of a collectivit territorialeand are listed in Annex IV of the Treaty
of Rome 0 2 as an entity to which the law of the European Community
does not apply. Both these classifications are generally reserved for
entities that may become independent states. 03 If the tribunal is
persuaded that the islands are a potentially independent state, it is
highly unlikely that it will choose to enclave them. If the tribunal
does employ the modified equidistance principle, it may be that, as
in the Libya-Malta Arbitration, it will adjust the boundary to the
detriment of the islands in recognition of the demands of proportionality. Even if it grants the islands a full 200-mile exclusive economic zone, it seems unlikely that it will accord them rights to the
continental shelf beyond that zone.

202 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11.

,03McDorman, Drawing a Line, supra note 18, at 187.
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-o C.R. Symmons, The Canadian 200-Mile Fishery Limit and the Delimitation of
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10 Hal Mills, Eastern Canada's Offshore Resources and Boundaries, 6:3 J. CAN.
STuD. 36, 37 (1971).
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Figure 2106
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Douglas Day, Maritime Boundaries, JurisdictionalDisputes, and Offshore Hydrocarbon Exploration in Eastern Canada, 23:3 J. CAN. STUD. 60, 70 (1988).
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Figure 3107
1wAgreement on Mutual Fishing Relations, Mar. 27, 1972, Can.-Fr., 862 U.N.T.S.
209, 218.
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,08 Ted L. McDorman, Canada and FranceAgree to Arbitrationfor the St. Pierre
and Miquelon Boundary Dispute, 5 INT'L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 357, 358,
(1990).
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Disp ted Area off St. Pierre and Miquelon

.

1964 and 1977 Mineral Rights Boundary
1977and 1982 Canada-Nova Scotio Mineral Rights Boundary
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1984 World Court Boundary
1982 Boyof Fundy Boundary

Figure 5109

109 Douglas Day, Maritime Boundaries, JurisdictionalDisputes, and Offshore Hydrocarbon Exploration in Eastern Canada, 23:3 J. CAN. STUD. 60, 65 (1988).
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,10Donat Pharand, The Cod War Between Canada and France, 18 REv. GtN.
627, 629 (1987).

